














	As everyone knows, there are (at least) two competing interpretations for the existential and universal quantifiers, ‘(…) …’ and ‘(…) …’ respectively.​[1]​  Loosely, interpretations of the former are to capture (in part) what is meant by the English ‘some …’, the latter ‘all …’.  These are typically given either a substitutional reading or an objectual reading.  Again loosely, following Haack​[2]​, an objectual reading of the quantifiers might go as follows:

‘(x) Fx’ is interpreted as ‘For all objects x, in the domain, D, Fx’
 
	‘(x) Fx’ is interpreted as ‘For at least one object, x, in the domain, D, Fx’.


Whereas, a substitutional reading is given (in part) by:


	‘(x) Fx’ is interpreted as ‘All substitution instances of “F…” are true’.
	
	‘(x) Fx’ is interpreted as ‘At least one substitution instance of “F…” is			true’.


There has been much discussion concerning what reading ought to be given the quantifiers, though this supposes that there is a preferred reading to be had.  It is, of course, entirely possible that the choice of interpretation may well be determined by practical considerations.
	In any event, substitutional interpretations of the quantifiers have taken a bit of a beating in the past couple of decades.  To again paraphrase Haack, it seems fair to say that the objectual interpretation is the standard, while the substitutional account is the one whose credentials need closer scrutiny.  However, my goal here is not to defend a substitutional account from criticism.  Here, I suggest that the credentials of the objectual account are at least as problematic.  In fact, they strike me as so problematic that I wonder if I have properly understood the view.

The Problem









	 In order to see exactly what the problem is, we will need to examine a more detailed account of how objectual quantification is supposed to work, and for that I turn to an account presented by Kripke.  While there are other accounts, Kripke’s contains the relevant bits, and an examination of his account will suffice to illustrate the difficulty with objectual quantification generally.  What follows is a rather lengthy quote, and I apologize for this.  It will, however, be helpful in making clear my worry.
	Kripke has characterized objectual quantification (‘referential’ quantification here) as follows:
A (first-order) language based on the standard, or ‘referential’ quantifier, is usually defined as follows.  We are given a (possibly empty, finite, or denumerable) list of primitive constants, a1, a2, a3, . . ., and a (possibly empty, finite, or denumerable) list of n-place function letters for each n, in.  There is also a denumerable list of variables x1, x2, . . .. A term is defined by the clauses: the primitive constants and variables are terms; if t1, . . ., tn are terms, so is in(t1, . . ., tn).  For each n, a similar list of primitive n-place predicates Pin  is given, and it is assumed there is at least one such predicate for at least one n.  Pin (t1, . . ., tn) is an atomic formula.  Formulae are defined as follows:  atomic formulae are formulae; if  and  are formulae, so is ; if  is a formula, so is ; if  is a formula so is (xi).  ((xi) can be defined as (xi)).
	Semantically, we interpret the standard quantifier as follows.  A non-empty domain D is given; also we are given a function F mapping every primitive constant into an element of D, every n-place function letter in an n-place function from Dn to D, and every n-place predicate letter into an n-place relation on D.  D is called the ‘range’ of the variable.  Let s = si be an infinite sequence of members of D.  Then for each term t, the denotation of t with respect to s is defined by:  the denotation of xi is si; the denotation of a primitive constant is the corresponding element of D; the denotation of in(t1, . . ., tn) is (a1, . . ., an), where  = F(in) is the function corresponding to in and a1, . . ., an  are the denotations of t1, . . ., tn.  For a term not containing any variables the denotation is independent of s.
	If Pin (t1, . . ., tn) is an atomic formula of , we say that s satisfies  iff the denotations of t1, . . ., tn with respect to s are related by the relation corresponding to Pin; s satisfies  iff s satisfies  and satisfies ; s satisfies  iff s does not satisfy ; s satisfies (xi) iff there is a sequence s’ of members of D differing from s in at most the ith place which satisfies .  A formula without free variables is true iff some sequence satisfies it.​[3]​  


So, what is problematic in this account?  The difficulty begins with the statement,


(1) 	‘Let s = si be an infinite sequence of members of D’


This suggests that the giving of the semantics of particular sets of quantified expressions requires the specification of a sequence of objects, and this is a standard requirement for objectual accounts.  This seems quite correct, for if a sequence of the objects in the domain is not given, little can be made of the following:

(2)	‘Then for each term t, the denotation of t with respect to s is defined by: the	denotation of xi is si. . . ‘


This appears to flesh out the ‘ranging over’ relation between the variables and the objects in the domain.  But, if ‘s’ has no denotation, then there is nothing in the ith place of s (for whatever i), and thus there is no denotation for the ith variable.  In short, without a specification of a sequence of objects in the domain, the objectual variables will fail to refer.  And, as the referential nature of its variables is thought to be one of the more redeeming features of objectual quantification, it would seem essential that such sequences be specified.  Further, without denoting variables or a specified sequence, little sense is to be made of satisfaction in the following:





(4)	‘s satisfies (xi) iff there is a sequence s’ of members of D differing from s in at	most the ith place which satisfies ’


So, again, it would seem essential that the requisite sequences of objects be specified if the variables are to be properly referential.
	The problem is that such sequences are seldom, if ever, specified in instances of the use of objectual quantifiers.  This isn’t all that surprising, in that it would very difficult, if not practically impossible, to specify such infinite sequences of objects – particularly when the domain is large and when the objects in the domain are unknown.  Imagine attempting to specify a requisite sequence for the quantified expression corresponding to the English, ‘Some fish are edible’, where the domain includes all fish.  The problem does not seem quite so severe for some large sequences.  For instance, it would seem rather more straightforward to specify a sequence of the natural numbers.  One might do so by uttering, ‘Let s = the sequence of natural numbers with their natural ordinality’.  What makes this sequence readily specifiable, however, is that the natural numbers do, in fact, have a natural ordinality (though not all sequences of the natural numbers would exhibit this).  To claim that there is an ordinality of any kind with regard to fish (or the objects in my desk drawer, or just about any other set of objects) would be to claim something rather amazing indeed.​[4]​  Even granting that there are sequences of such objects will not avoid the problem (and that would be granting a lot), for it is the specifying of a particular sequence that is necessary if the variables are, in fact, to refer.​[5]​ Pointing out that such sequences are specifiable in principle, or that such sets of objects can be so ordered, is similarly of no help.
	One might counter that a sequence can be defined by rule.  For instance, one might specify a sequence of fish by ordering them according to their size or when the came into existence.  So, one might say, ‘Let s = the sequence of fish ordered from smallest to largest’, etc.  However this is problematic for a couple of reasons.  First, there would have to be a fact of the matter concerning relative sizes (or time entering existence, etc.) for any ordering on this measure to take place.  For objects in my desk drawer, this might not be an issue.  But for fish in the sea, it might well be the case that there is no way, even in principle, to order fish on these measures.  It seems entirely plausible that determination of the relative sizes of fish will be a genuinely vague matter.  
	Further, any ordering of objects in the method suggested would seem to require the use of quantified expressions:  e.g. ‘For all objects in the domain, if there is some object that is smaller than . . .’.  This will only place the burden of specifying sequences on these instances of quantification.  A sequence-specifying regress seems unavoidable.       
	It is important to note that it is not the infinite aspect of the sequences that makes specification problematic.  Large finite sequences (say, a sequence of all fish, where each fish appears in only one place) are no easier to specify.  
This is not to say that such specifications cannot be done in any cases. Cases in which the domain is small and one knows of all the objects in the domain are not so problematic.  Or, in cases of existential quantification, if one knows of one object in the domain, one might specify a sequence (even an infinite sequence) containing only that object in each place.​[6]​  So perhaps it can be done in some cases.  (Though, again, in actual practice, it is almost never done.)  





	So, given the difficulties in specifying the requisite sequences, it will be difficult to provide a full semantics for most instances of objectual quantification.  Both sides of the biconditionals in (3) and (4) would (in the great majority of cases) contain non-referring terms.  There seems an obvious response to the above critique, and that is to claim that (1) is to be read counterfactually.  That is, instead of (1) being a requirement to specify a particular sequence, we are merely to suppose that s were a sequence.  That is, instead of (1) above, we get something like:

(1*)	Let us suppose there were an infinite sequence, s, of members of D.


This would, of course, remove the requirement of specifying a sequence, or even that there are, actually, any sequences (infinite or otherwise) of members of D.  This seems a reasonable supposition, for, after all, it shouldn’t matter what sequence is used.  If one such sequence of members of D satisfies (or would satisfy) a formula, then they all do (would).  
	However, it should be noted that if (1) is replaced with something like (1*), then much of the rest of the semantic account must be read counterfactually as well.  Concerning (2) above, it would make little sense to say that were s a sequence of members of D, xi denotes si. Such claims are not even grammatical, as the moods of the antecedent and consequent do not agree.   Rather, we should say the following:

(2*)	Were there an infinite sequence, s = si, of the members of D, then it would be the case that xi denotes si . . . ​[9]​


and so on for other terms whose denotation is defined relative to s.  A similar revision of (3) and (4) above yields:





(4*)	were there an infinite sequence, s, of members of D, it would be the case that s satisfies (xi) iff there were a sequence s’ of members of D differing from s in at most the ith place which satisfies 

  
	However, it will be noticed that, under these readings, quantified expressions are not about what is the case, but rather about what is the case in near possible worlds – ones in which the counterfactual conditions are met.  This is problematic for a semantic account of the quantifiers in that it would seem reasonable to suppose that those who make use of (otherwise) non-modal quantified expressions do so in an attempt to make claims about the actual world, not about what goes on in near possible worlds.
	Further, and more troublingly, the counter-factual conditions in question are essentially denotation conditions.  Concerning  (2*), (3*), and (4*), satisfaction is characterized as something that would be the case were the terms (particularly, the bound variables) to have a certain denotation.  One would think that, in the vast majority cases, whether or not an object or a sequence of objects satisfies some open sentence would not be at all relative to any denotation conditions.  Whether or not some fish or other satisfies the open sentence ‘…is edible.’ seems entirely independent of whether anything denotes. 
Further still, concerning (3*), it makes little sense to characterize satisfaction as what would be the case were the denotations of the terms related in such and such a way.  If the denoting of the terms (the variables) is counter to fact, then there is nothing that would be the case, were the denotations of the terms related in some way or other.  It only makes sense to say what would be the case were the denotations of t1, t2, . . . related in a certain way, if those terms denote.  If they do not denote, then there is no near possible world in which their denotations are related in some way.​[10]​  And thus, there would be no satisfaction in such cases. 

An Alternate Reading
	These difficulties might be avoided by dropping satisfaction from the interpretation in favor of truth.  For instance, one might opt for an interpretation of ‘(x) Fx’ as being (for a given domain),

(#)	Were there an infinite sequence, s = si, of the members of D, and were it the case that xi denotes si, and were the constants and the variables substituends, then some substitution instance of ‘F…’ would be true.


 - and so on for the other formulae. This interpretation has the benefit of retaining

the idea that the variables are, in a sense, referential, while allowing that they do not actually refer.  In other words, were the variables to refer as prescribed in (2*), substituting them into the expression ‘F…’ would yield at least one true sentence (all true ones, in the case of universal quantification).  And, even though this account has substitutional characteristics, it avoids the common objection that substitutional quantification requires more names than are available to do the job.  On the view suggested here, there needn’t be any names at all.  To be is not to be the value of a bound variable.  Rather, to be is to be nameable (in the way described in #).
No doubt, this alternate account will meet with some resistance, as it is clearly as much a substitutional account of the quantifiers as it is an objectual account.  And just as obviously, this interpretation retains a counterfactual characterization.​[11]​ 









^1	  The notations vary from system to system.  I chose these only because this is the notation I learned and am thus most comfortable with it.  Nothing at all hangs on this choice.
^2	  Haack, S.  (1978).  Philosophy of Logics.  Cambridge University Press.  Cambridge.  p. 42.
^3	  Kripke, S.  (1976).  ‘Is There a Problem for Substitutional Quantification’, in Truth and Meaning.  Eds. Evans and McDowell.  Oxford.
^4	  With a few exceptions (as in the case of natural numbers), I’m inclined to think that being ordered is the result of cognitive activities.  If correct, there are very few actual infinite sequences.  Interestingly, if there are no actual infinite sequences, then there are no true formulae, given Kripke’s assertion, ‘A formula without free variables is true iff some sequence satisfies it.’   Surprisingly, there is little in the literature on the ontological status of sequences.
^5	  I trust no one will be tempted by the claim that somehow the denotation of ‘s’ can be fixed by an indefinite description, ‘an infinite sequence of members of D’ (for whatever D).
^6	  I have in mind cases like that concerning the quantified equivalent of, ‘Some mammals swim’, where one might specify an infinite sequence containing Flipper in each place.  While this will solve the specification problem, it will only do so for existential quantification, not universal quantification.  Further, this would lead to the odd consequence that the truth-value of the quantified expression would be dependent on the sequence chosen.  In addition, I find contemplating the ontological status of a sequence containing one object appearing in multiple places preposterous.
^7	  Though, as suggested before, this will be problematic as well, if objectual quantifiers are used in picking out the domain.
^8	  It has been suggested to me that what Kripke is doing in (1) is using a meta-quantifier, such that a more careful reading of (1) would give something like, ‘For all x, if x is a sequence s= {si} of objects in domain D, then . . .’.  If this is the case, then I think it a mistake for several reasons.  First, I find it explanatorily irresponsible to use a meta-variant of the concept to be explained in the explanation itself.  To use a meta-quantifier (introduced here as a technical notion) in giving the semantics of objectual quantification is to do without a satisfactory semantics.  Second, it seems clear that the denotation relation described in (2) does not follow from the mere existence of sequences of objects in the domain.  Thus, even on the assumption that there are sequences of objects in the domain (a dubious claim, for most domains), this reading of (1) commits us something false.  Finally, what are we to make of this reading if there are no actual sequences of objects in the domain?  On a truth-functional reading of the conditional, since the antecedent is false, the conditional is true.  Surely, it cannot be seriously argued that all quantified expressions concerning domains of objects without corresponding sequences are true.  These latter two difficulties could perhaps be resolved by replacing the conditional with a counterfactual conditional.  More on this in what follows.
^9	  It may be noticed that the counterfactual account suggested here applies to assignment functions generally.  
^10	  The same difficulty holds for (1*), (3*) and (4*) concerning s.  For in (1*), ‘Let us suppose s were a sequence of members of D’ must just as well be read, “Let us suppose ‘s’ were to denote a sequence of members of D”.  Since ‘s’ has no content independent of (1*) [or (1), as the case may be], it makes little sense to say what s would be like in such and such a case, and it would thus make little sense to say what s would satisfy, as in (3*) and (4*).  If ‘s’ does not denote, then it makes no sense to speak of what s would be like in some near possible world.
^11	  I don’t consider this much of a worry, as I’m inclined to think that the standard substitutional account of the quantifiers ought to be read counterfactually in any case.  To claim that there are substitution instances of a certain sort is not to claim, I take it, that such substitutions have actually taken place.  Rather, it is to claim that were such substitutions to be made, such and such would be the case. 
